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Abstract. The widespread adoption of autonomous intrusion detec-
tion technology is overwhelming current frameworks for network security
management. Modern intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and intelligent
agents are the most mentioned in literature and news, although other
risks such as broad attacks (e.g. very widely spread in a distributed
fashion like botnets), and their consequences on incident response man-
agement cannot be overlooked. Event correlation becomes then essential.
Basically, security event correlation pulls together detection, prevention
and reaction tasks by means of consolidating huge amounts of event data.
Providing adaptation to unknown distributed attacks is a major require-
ment as well as their automatic identification. This positioning paper
poses an optimization challenge in the design of such correlation engine
and a number of directions for research. We present a novel approach for
automatic generation of security event correlation rules based on Genetic
Programming which has been already used at sensor level.
Key Words: Event Correlation, Rule Generation, Genetic Program-
ming, Network Security Management
1 Introduction
Nowadays, network security management is a critical task which involves differ-
ent security data sources, e.g. IDSs, firewalls, server logs, to name a few. One the
one hand, these sources (known as sensors) produces high amounts of heteroge-
neous information, generally difficult to understand. Thus, cooperation among
these sensors becomes essential for security information management. On the
other hand, modern attacks pose a challenge to the network infrastructure as
these attacks may be not noticed when inspecting each one separately. Event
correlation was therefore conceived as a palliative for both problems.
Security information Management (SIM) systems help to gather, organize
and correlate security network information, i.e. reducing the amount of time
spent by security administrators. OSSIM [1] is an open source SIM implementa-
tion which centralizes the detection and monitoring of the security events within
an organization. Nevertheless, correlation techniques included in OSSIM are not
able to efficiently detect broad attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS).
In this context, we are therefore facing the classical problem of providing
optimization to a data mining analysis. Many disciplines exist within data min-
ing; those are particular advantageous when connected to artificial intelligence
algorithms. Indeed, Genetic Programming (GP) introduces several interesting
properties to deal with building complex event correlation rules: Rules can be
represented as computer programs with length variability.
Our contribution: In this positioning paper, we elaborate on applying GP
to optimize log correlation methods. Specifically, we introduce the main aspects
of our current work, which is aimed at building optimized OSSIM rules by means
of the application of evolutionary computation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline emer-
gent problems related to current IDSs and event correlation techniques. Section 3
describes the foundations of our case study, i.e. automatic generation of correla-
tion rules for the OSSIM. Finally, in Section 4 we establish the main conclusions
as well as the immediate future work. As this is a work in progress, each sec-
tion intents to describe the position of this line of research in each one of the
corresponding areas.
2 Related Work
Several disciplines are related to security event correlation. Here we describe the
most representatives.
2.1 Intrusion Detection
As stated in [2], IDSs such as SNORT are not enough to detect complex attacks
over a network. Depending on where the IDS is placed they will detect some
things and skip some others as well as valuable information logged in other
devices such as firewalls, routers, web servers, operating system logs... is also
missed.
2.2 Event Correlation Techniques
To solve the problem originated by the huge amount of events it is necessary to
look into all the implicated devices over the enterprise network. Two possible
solutions in this way have been proposed: Data Aggregation (centralization of
the information) and Event Correlation (combination of multiple events into one
relevant event).
Among its advantages, data aggregation provides a centralized management
as well as a unification of the security events into a single format; whereas the
high volume of the gathered information can be a disadvantage. On the other
hand, we can distinguish the following event correlation mechanisms such as
those based on statistics, bayesian inference, alert fusion and data correlation
(Micro and Macro correlations).
In fact, the latter shows promise as a security event correlation since other
models mentioned before are not especially appropriated [2].
Data correlation has to deal with performance issues in a similar way to
data mining classic problems. Instead, the application of artificial intelligence
techniques involves amount of properties such as flexibility, adaptability, pattern
recognition, efficiency [3], to name a few.
An interesting approach to event correlation at the application layer is pro-
posed in [4] in which involving Network, Kernel and Application Layer an ef-
ficient correlation is performed. Additionally, authors in [5] use probabilistic
correlation techniques, i.e. Bayesian networks, to increase the sensitivity, reduce
false alarms and improve log report quality. The correlation is carried out in
both sensor and alert models.
2.3 OSSIM Correlation
OSSIM has the ability to correlate attacks using both sequence of events and
heuristic algorithms. In the former, the correlation engine [6] generates alerts
when a detected event matches the pattern described by a rule. These rules
are called “detector rules”. Once a detector rule is triggered, OSSIM can start
monitoring the sensors providing indicators to the correlation engine: this is done
by using “monitoring rules”.
Contrarily, correlation engine based on heuristic algorithms generates an in-
dicator or snapshot of the global security state of the network as result of event
agregation.
Nevertheless, attack signatures must be defined in advance in both methods.
Moreover, classic methods lack of efficiency on pattern recognition. For instance,
open problems focus on the application of artificial intelligence to provide Data
Mining optimization. Evolutionary algorithms are especially suitable for those
problems in which a cost–effort trade-off exists. Event correlation is a good
example –achieving the optimal solution is feasible, but it is not affordable at
all–. Time and computational savings lead us to employ AI-based techniques.
Finally, more robust event correlation engine is provided by BITACORA [7].
2.4 Evolutionary Computation
Evolutionary Computation (EC) [8] is a branch of the Artificial Intelligence
paradigm which is based on the species evolution theory. Each iteration of an
evolutionary algorithm execution (also known as generation) represents a set
of solutions. Afterwards, this set is evaluated, and the best individuals will be
selected. The basic genetic operators are used over these individuals to produce
next generations. This way, an evolutionary algorithm can be described as a
supervised search technique.
Genetic programming [9] is a EC-based methodology, where individuals are
represented as computer programs. This fact leads to interesting advantages,
i.e. individuals can be defined in a flexible representation. The use of a vari-
ant of standard GP which is called Gene Expression Programming (GEP) has
been proposed in [10]. In this work, authors state that size of populations and
the number of generations are critical, sometimes too high, thus these incur a
high cost in term of the search space and time. GEP, Linear GP and Multi-
Expression Programming (MEP) are analyzed and used to extract IDS rules in
[11]. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, GP has not been applied to
event correlation. Indeed, GP is especially suitable on this domain due to the
intrinsic characteristics of correlation rules i.e. they have variable lengths and
may be expressed by computer routines.
3 Applying Genetic Programming to Event Correlation
We now describe how to apply GP [12] to event correlation. In particular, we
focus on the automatically generation of correlation rules, once security logs have
been centralized in the system intrusion management (SIM) provided by OSSIM
framework.
3.1 Experimental Environment
Briefly, we now describe the emulation environment. First, we collect SIM alerts
that OSSIM Server generates as the result of distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks. These attacks are launched from a botnet located at the same environ-
ment. The collected DDoS traces will be finally used as a training set to evaluate
the individuals in each generation. Note that our simulations do not learn in real
time. Next sections overview all the stages of our experiments.
The development environment is based on ECJ framework, i.e. a Java-based
Evolutionary Computation toolkit [13]. ECJ assists in the deployment of genetic
program setting the challenge to the definition of the individual, the fitness
function and other parameters such as the number of individuals.
Specifically, we use Standard GP where an individual is represented as a
“forest of trees”, and the genome (i.e. individual’s genetic code) is represented
as a tree. Tree’s nodes are operator functions whereas tree’s terminals are the
genome’s selected attributes. For instance, from our simulations, results espe-
cially rely on three building blocks: (i) the representation of the solution, (ii)
how the fitness function represents the objective of the problem and, (iii) how
the crossover and mutation operators are defined. We further elaborate on this
concerns in the following sections.
3.2 Preliminary Format Definition
As the result of the evaluation of the alerts stored on the OSSIM, we have selected
the following attributes to be introduced on our Genetic Program. These are the
following: Destination IP, Destination Port, Source IP, Source Port, Time stamp
and Type of event.
Our goal is to design our Genetic Program as much general as possible. We
would like to leave the door open for the future so we can extend our rule
generator to other Security Information Manager such as BITACORA.
For this purpose we have decided to give a normalized format to the events.
OSSIM output and our GP input are expressed in IDMEF (Detection Message
Exchange Format) format [14].
Also, it is necessary to give a normalized type for the event type. The problem
is that each IDS follows its own taxonomy. We have solved this problem by
parsing the event type string and taking the main keywords that can be found
on the event type. Examples on such keywords are ”FTP”,”NMAP”, etc.
3.3 Representation of the Individual
At first we represented the individuals with the parameters described in 3.2.
These parameters come straight forward from the attributes used by some sensor.
The use of this attributes provides us the ability of extending the correlations
to other systems. A problem to be solved is that we need more attributes to
compound a rule; some of the attributes are specific from OSSIM such as the
reliability, the occurrence and many others.
As non terminal nodes we have selected the Boolean functions AND and OR.
We present two open alternatives for terminal node representation. Terminal
nodes are defined as ERC (Ephemeral Random Constants) nodes to guarantee
the coherence of the randomly selected and crossed values.
First Approach: Rule as an ERC Let’s specify first the resultant work we
are looking for. We want our genetic program to automatically generate valid
directives for the OSSIM correlator engine.
One directive is compound by many rules in the relation: Directive −→
(Rule+).
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Fig. 1. (a) Genetic tree directive (b) A Rule as a ERC terminal element
As all the rules can have the same arguments and we want to generate rules
that operate with other rules, (Figure 1 a) the best encoding of the attributes
that we can do is to wrap them into an ERC data type. This ERC will define a
Rule (Figure 1 b)
A major problem for this representation is that the all the attributes from
the rule have to be randomly generated and is much more complicated (in terms
of computation) to generate a ’good’ rule.
The search space is bigger since we have to find sets of attributes (a rule),
with all its possible combinations, that have elements in common with other
attributes of another rule.
Second Approach: Attributes as an ERC This second solution tries to
solve the problem encountered on the first approach. In this case the terminal
elements are the attributes.
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Fig. 2. (a) Attributes as an ERC terminal elements. (b)Genetic tree directive
A major problem for this representation is that we are treating the attributes
as terminal elements so a possible solution is a tree where attributes of a rule N
can operate with attributes of the rule M, where N can be equal to M; this is
not always a valid OSSIM directive.
3.4 Genetic Operators
The following genetic operators are performed: reproduction, mutation and crossover.
The reproduction operator is responsible of the clonation of the individuals:
These cloned individuals are randomly modified in the mutation operator. Dur-
ing mutation and crossover operators we have use default ECJ framework values.
ECJ provides a simple way to implement a specific crossover and mutation
operators. Depending on the accuracy of the results, this might be implemented.
3.5 Training and Fitness Function
Each round of the algorithm will be evaluated with a training set logged in our
training environment which contains events from specific attacks.
Additionally, the fitness function will be based on the risk assessment as
defined by OSSIM.
Therefore, detector rules follow a logical evaluation of the attributes. Each
time an event is detected by a rule, its parameter Reliability is incremented.
This change also affects the Risk calculation. In this situation, considering the
Risk parameter for building the fitness function seems to be suitable. Since the
monitoring rules (Eq. 1) follow a heuristic algorithm which is defined as the risk
that the monitorized asset might be suffering for a specific thread (reliability of
the possible attack) and the priority of the directive.
Risk =
(Asset · Priority ·Reliability)
25
(1)
4 Conclusions and Research Directions
In this positioning paper, we have studied the suitability of evolutionary compu-
tation techniques to improve the efficiency of current security event correlation
mechanisms. In fact, genetic programming lets us manage the problem in a very
natural way: correlation rules can be built based on the evolution of individuals
as a mechanism to discover event “proximity”. We have outlined our findings
in building OSSIM correlation directives by means of GP. Nevertheless, our
approach faces up some research problems, such as an appropriate population
representation and the generation of a suitable training set.
In the short term, we further elaborate on the task of correlation and pattern
matching which is still one for a strong analysis concern. Finally, as future work,
we are evaluating the viability of the presented representation of the problem,
which seems to be a completely original approach to tackle the security event
correlation problem, by means of system emulation.
Our hope is that this paper will, directly or indirectly, inspire new directions
in efficiently automatizing security event correlation.
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